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INTRODUCTION

From September 19, 1994, to March 31, 1995, the U.S. government
intervened militarily in Haiti. Conducted under UN Security Council Resolution 940 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Operation
Uphold Democracy was the most convoluted military invasion in
American history. Due to former president Jimmy Carter’s successful last-minute negotiations with an illegal junta, President
William J. Clinton turned around about one hundred aircraft and
airborne troops twenty minutes before hostilities were set to commence. Commanders and their units then prepared to enter the
country peacefully, scrambling to switch from a war mentality to
a peacekeeping mind-set overnight. Operational disorder ensued
for weeks even as thousands of multinational forces and numerous
agencies entered the country to advise and support Haiti’s fledgling democratic government. With mission handover to the United
Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) on March 31, 1995, many U.S.
troops departed while others donned blue berets to serve under UN
command. For fifteen months, UNMIH troops, 40 percent of them
from the United States, assisted Haitians and their government in
furthering democracy before mission transfer to yet another UN
force, the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH).
The 1994 U.S.-led military intervention also allowed the U.S.
Army major and Haitian American Anthony “Tony” Ladouceur
to return to his native country. In 1967 Ladouceur left Haiti to
spend his teenage years with relatives in New York City while his
businessman father remained in Port-au-Prince. American citizenship and an army enlistment led to a commission through officer candidate school. As a cultural advisor and translator for the
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military intervention’s commander, Lt. Gen. Henry H. “Hugh”
Shelton, the Haiti-born major was able to visit his father’s mountainside home overlooking Port-au-Prince. “I will show you a picture of it,” he said. “He has a fifty-foot wall around it. He enters
through three doors: a wooden door, a reinforced metal door, and
then another metal door, both in the front and the back. All the
windows have metal bars on them. He has a loaded shotgun and
a strategic location in his house where he goes if something starts
to happen. One of his neighbors was robbed and they killed his
son in the house. He was hiding when they shot his son but then
he came at them with a machete. They had Uzi submachine guns
and they just wasted him.”1
Three weeks later Capt. Doni Colon, U.S. Army, arrived. His
participation in the military intervention began with debarkation at Port-au-Prince International Airport in October 1994. It
was also his first exposure to the Western Hemisphere’s poorest country. While being transported to his headquarters, Colon
witnessed an airport terminal controlled by heavily armed U.S.
combat troops, throngs of Haitian pedestrians and street vendors
conducting their affairs along dirt streets, and American infantrymen on foot patrol circumventing heaps of human waste and
rotting garbage. While nearly vomiting from the stench, Colon
observed Haitians “washing themselves by throwing a bucket into
the sewer and bringing water out and also cleaning their clothes
and stuff in that.” A subsequent safety briefing on AIDS increased
Colon’s growing consternation about Haiti. “I was told that Haitians do not believe that AIDS is really a disease. They believe it
is done by someone to you. You can’t get it if protected by a particular voodoo [vodun] religious spell. They might make a little
charm or do a saying at home to protect them and it is the same
with many diseases here. They just do not understand the science,
the reality of it. To them, it is magic and superstition.” After less
than twenty-four hours in country, Colon grimly stated, “This
place is in trouble.”2
This book is about Ladouceur, Colon, and others like them who
served during Operation Uphold Democracy and UNMIH from
xiv | Introduction
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1994 to 1996. It is an oral history of the two military interventions,
as told by the men and women who personally experienced them.
Because it is concerned with military incursions from a personal
viewpoint, this study asks a straightforward but important question: What happens to the military men and women who plan
and execute military interventions and the civilians who observe
them firsthand?
In a contemporary sense, military intervention as a form of preventive diplomacy began on June 17, 1992, six months after the
Cold War ended, when UN secretary-general Boutros BoutrosGhali submitted his Security Council report entitled An Agenda
for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping.”
In it he articulated his vision for the UN in resolving post– Cold
War conflicts peacefully. To the secretary-general, the ideological struggle between the West and the East had terminated but
various population groups now threatened international peace
through “new claims of nationalism and sovereignty.” To “remove
sources of danger before violence resulted,” he reiterated that the
UN Charter’s Chapter VI allowed for peaceful intervention in international disputes. In the absence of a nonviolent solution, however, Chapter VII and Article 42 permitted a UN armed force to
maintain international peace and security. Through preventive
diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, or postconflict peacebuilding, the UN members’ judicious application of the charter’s
authority and appropriate use of military force would “address
the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice,
and political oppression.”3
In the early 1990s Haiti certainly met the criteria for a UN military intervention under Chapter VI or Chapter VII. But the use of
armed troops to intervene in places such as the island of Hispaniola has generated considerable debate. Historically, intervention
to end human suffering is traceable to St. Augustine and Thomas
Aquinas and Christian theories of “just war.” More recently, Andrea
Kathryn Talentino’s Military Intervention after the Cold War: The
Evolution of Theory and Practice (2005) represents those who doubt
its usefulness. In the case of Haiti, Talentino concludes that armed
Introduction | xv
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1. The face of military intervention: a wary U.S. soldier canvasses the Portau-Prince streets. Source: Department of Defense.

intervention accomplished little because the effort was far too
limited in scope and reflected a “one and done” attitude of get in
and get out. In truth, Maj. Robert B. Geddis, U.S. Army, verified
her point by remarking, “I kind of took to Haiti that it is a problem
that they got to work out. We are here to help; let’s do our job and
then leave.” Richard N. Haass, in Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post–Cold War World (1999) also questions
the value of military interventions to alleviate human suffering.
His book offers recommendations for decision makers to consider
when determining whether to intervene. Glenn J. Antizzo’s U.S.
Military Intervention in the Post– Cold War Era: How to Win America’s Wars in the Twenty-First Century (2013) advocates for military interventions as long as objectives are clearly defined, public
support is secured, and decision makers have the will to use force
when necessary.4
These important studies take an argumentative stance to weigh
the merits and drawbacks of intervening or offer an advisory perspective intended to sway policy makers. Noticeably absent from
xvi | Introduction
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the existing literature is an attentive examination of military interventions from the standpoint of those who actually plan and execute them “on the ground.”
To address that deficiency, this book uses oral histories to disclose the personal experiences of general officers, commanders,
staff officers, noncommissioned officers, and others involved in
Operation Uphold Democracy and UNMIH. Their insights speak
to strategic, operational, and tactical planning considerations,
intelligence gathering, multinational force interaction, mission
execution conundrums, communications and language concerns,
ethnic and cultural factors, and other topics. Collectively, they
shed valuable light on what it actually means to intervene militarily in the affairs of others.
The oral histories used here resulted from a chief of staff of the
army directive to produce a history of the service’s role in Operation Uphold Democracy. From 1994 until 1999 I led a research
team as a regular army lieutenant colonel and faculty member
assigned to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
(CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Professors Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel, along with U.S. Army reservists and
CGSC students, also conducted interviews. We followed guidelines within the U.S. Army’s Center of Military History publication Oral History: Techniques and Procedures. Department of the
Army regulations for documenting ongoing military operations
and distributing public information about them guided our efforts.
Military participants released their oral histories as government
employees and public servants. Nongovernment civilians also
agreed to public release, as concerned citizens. The unclassified
interview records are within the public domain and accessible
through the Combined Arms Research Library archives at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.5
The reasons why the UN and the U.S. government would intervene militarily in Haiti are complex and understanding them
requires revisiting Haiti’s position within international circles
and in relation to the United States. The island of Hispaniola is
strategically important, for it is but 1,530 miles from UN headIntroduction | xvii
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quarters in New York to Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, equivalent
to the distance from Los Angeles, California, to Topeka, Kansas. Haiti is also 690 miles off the U.S. coast, equal to the driving
distance from Chicago, Illinois, to Washington DC. Soon after
Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s ouster in 1991, the UN secretary-general
encouraged the formation of the UN Group of Friends of Haiti,
a political, economic, and diplomatic assistance body including
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Guatemala, Peru, the
United States, and Uruguay. U.S. membership has much to do
with national security because of unlawful immigration and Haiti’s role as an illegal drug conduit through which tons of cocaine
enters America annually. Stopping illegal immigrants and countering Haitian drug smuggling composes a significant portion of
U.S. counterdrug operations and expenditures.6
Once considered the “pearl of the Antilles,” Haiti is the poorest Western Hemisphere country, with a 10 percent adult literacy rate. Only 50 percent of Haitian children attend school. The
country ranks among the ten least-educated nations globally, with
the other nine located in Africa. The relatively few educated Haitians are typically wealthy and attended foreign universities. They
often become expats, leaving their country for the United States
and other locales, such as Canada.
Haiti’s loss of educated citizens creates a national “brain drain”
as well as a substantial diaspora in many countries. The 2010 U.S.
Census reported 975,000 Haitian Americans, concentrated in Florida, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Delaware, and Wisconsin. There are prominent Haitian American
judges, lawyers, politicians, military officers, entertainers, businessmen and businesswomen, artists, musicians, and models in
the United States, as well as the 1991 Miss America and numerous
professional athletes. Haitian Americans send millions of dollars
to their relatives in Haiti each year.
Although the relationship between Haiti and North America is
well established, surprisingly little has been published about Operation Uphold Democracy and UNMIH. John R. Ballard’s Upholding
Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–
xviii | Introduction
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1997 (1998) conveys his personal views as a member of U.S. Atlantic Command’s Joint Analysis and Assessment Team in Haiti and
Norfolk, Virginia. His work is chronological and sophisticated
and includes some participant interview material. A book I coauthored with Baumann and Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold
Democracy (1998), was published by the U.S. Army’s Command
and General Staff College Press and focused on army operations
in Haiti. Additional works include Bob Shacochis’s The Immaculate Invasion (1999), an excellent personal story of an imbedded
journalist with U.S. Special Forces units in Haiti. Stan Goff’s Hideous Dream: A Soldier’s Memoir of the U.S. Invasion of Haiti (2000)
is another personal account. Lawrence E. Casper’s Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti (2001) offers
insights into military intervention operational and tactical decision making. Ralph Pezzullo’s Plunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Diplomacy (2006) and Philippe Girard’s
Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti (2004) offer superb
general histories of Haiti and cover specific events leading up
to the military intervention and afterward. How the local populace engages UN peacekeepers is covered in Béatrice Pouligny’s
Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People
(2006). Several complementary works highlight the two interventions through the lenses of U.S. and Haitian economic, government, humanitarian, political, military, or social issues. They
include Amnesty International’s On the Horns of a Dilemma: Military Repression or Foreign Invasion? (1994); Charles Arthur’s, After
the Dance: Haiti: One Year after the Invasion (1995); and Karen
von Hippel’s, Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the
Post– Cold War World (2000). The UN Security Council: From the
Cold War to the 21st Century, edited by David M. Malone (2004),
includes a comprehensive chapter on the Security Council’s role in
the Haitian intervention. Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The
Case of Haiti, edited by John T. Fishel and Andrés Sáenz (2007);
Ronald H. Cole, Mission to Haiti: Direction and Support of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations, 1994–2000 (2008); and
Introduction | xix
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Aaron L. Wilkins, The Civil Military Operations Center in Operation Uphold Democracy (2012) are valuable for deducing practical “lessons learned.” All of these studies assist in understanding
the military intervention in Haiti.
This book adds to the body of work on military interventions
in several ways. It illustrates how oral history assists in explaining past events. Those interested in foreign relations and military
history should find it useful for what it says about executive policy
becoming operational reality. The work further illuminates what
happens to men and women in uniform when ordered into harm’s
way. Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Kinzer, U.S. Army, the commanding
general of UNMIH, explained in his interview why the Haiti military intervention is a worthwhile study: “You should look at this
and think about having to do something like it.” Before taking
Kinzer’s advice, however, it is necessary to give some thought to
military intervention in light of how Haiti’s people have historically viewed the use of military power.7
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